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All service types that leverage Kerberos authentication have SPNs registered in Active Directory since SPNs are required for Kerberos to work. For the attacker, one of the most useful SPN types to scan for is “SQL” to discover all SQL servers registered in Active Directory. I have previously written about “ SPN Scanning” for recon which involves requesting specific Service Principal Name (SPN) types from a Domain Controller (requires a user or computer account). Traditionally, attackers have performed recon using network port scanning, though this is usually not required on modern networks thanks to use of Active Directory and Kerberos. This information is based on the presentations I gave at several security conferences in 2015 (BSides, Shakacon, Black Hat, DEF CON, & Derb圜on) and Tim Medin’s Derb圜on “Attacking Microsoft Kerberos Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades” presentation in 2014 ( slides & video) where he released the Kerberoast Python TGS cracker. This post covers another type of Kerberos attack that involves Kerberos TGS service ticket cracking using Kerberoast.

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Skeleton Key In-memory Malware – malware “patches” the LSASS authentication process in-memory on Domain Controllers to enable a second, valid “skeleton key” password with which can be used to authenticate any domain account.Diamond PAC – blended attack type using elements of the Golden Ticket and the MS14-068 forged PAC.MS14-068 Forged PAC Exploit – exploitation of the Kerberos vulnerability on Domain Controllers.Golden Ticket – forged Kerberos TGT authentication ticket.Silver Ticket – forged Kerberos TGS service ticket.SPN Scanning – finding services by requesting service principal names of a specific SPN class/type.Here are the most popular AD Kerberos attacks:

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There are several different types of Kerberos attacks ranging from recon (SPN Scanning), to offline service account password cracking (Kerberoast), to persistence (Silver & Golden Tickets).

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Will also posted on how to Kerberoast without using Mimikatz.

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This article describes how Service Principal Names work and how to use Kerberoast to crack passwords offline. The other demos Will did during the talk are here.Īll of the slides and most videos of my talks are on the Presentations page. The slides and video from our talk are now available. Will Schroeder ( ) and I spoke at Derb圜on 6 in September, 2016 and demonstrated how Kerberoast works. (in other words, when AES is the Kerberos encryption This means that while Kerberos RC4 encryption leveraged the NTLM password hash as encryption key, Kerberos AES encryption uses the AES hash to encrypt the Kerberos tickets.

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With the introduction of AES as a Kerberos encryption option, Windows uses AES for hashing which is a break from traditional Windows password hashing methods. While AES Kerberos encryption is now used by default on the newer operating systems, there may still be significant use of RC4 Kerberos encryption on the network, involving some interesting network devices that have AES Kerberos encryption disabled by default. In fact, AES encryption wasn’t available as an option on Windows until Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. RC4 Kerberos encryption is still supported even now, 15 years later. Once the NTLM password hash is discovered, it can be used in a variety of ways, including re-compromising the Active Directory domain (think Golden Tickets & Silver Tickets). The easy way to do this was to use the NTLM password hash as the Kerberos RC4 encryption private key used to encrypt/sign Kerberos tickets. This support meant that Microsoft needed to support several different clients and enable them to speak Kerberos. When Microsoft released Windows 2000 and Active Directory along with it, they needed to support Windows NT and Windows 95 which meant a wide variety of security (and less secure configurations). There are several Kerberos attacks that take advantage of Microsoft’s legacy support in Active Directory. This legacy support is enabled when using Kerberos RC4 encryption (RC4_HMAC_MD5) since the NTLM password hash is used extensively with this encryption type. The issues are primarily related to the legacy support in Kerberos when Active Directory was released in the year 2000 with Windows Server 2000.

Microsoft’s Kerberos implementation in Active Directory has been targeted over the past couple of years by security researchers and attackers alike.